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ICC Jurisdiction of Great Lakes Rail-Water
Competition
Arthur E. Miller*
T HE DECLINE OF THE INDEPENDENT Great Lakes water carrier is of sub-
stantial importance to transportation users located in the midwest
industrial region who depend on effective competition to insure non-
discriminatory treatment in the commercial forum. Although the Inter-
state Commerce Commission has supervised the competitive arena, the
age and condition of the Great Lakes fleet manifests water carrier in-
ability to overcome railroad economic power. The viability and future
existence of the Great Lakes water carrier could well be determined
by a Commission decisioni a in a current coal case which represents the
most serious in a long history of rail attacks on waterborne traffic.
The regulatory framework surrounding the transportation industry
is complex and the absence of any easy resolution of contemporary prob-
lems fostered by competitive abuse can be appreciated only by viewing
the development and application of administrative powers initiated by
the Act to Regulate Commerce.'
The Interstate Commerce Commission
The Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887 by The
Act to Regulate Commerce and is charged with responsibility for
enforcing policy and regulatory control in transportation. After the
Supreme Court invalidated state efforts to control railroad monopoly
power,2 an impartial tribunal was needed to preserve a free competitive
marketplace for small volume shippers and unfortunately situated com-
munities who were deprived of equal economic growth because of rate
concessions exacted by influential industrialists and politicians.
3
The Act of 1887 did not provide the comprehensive power needed
by the Commission to carry out Congressional intent. As a result, nu-
* B.A., University of Virginia; Fourth-year student at Cleveland State University,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; employed at Oglebay Norton Company, Cleve-
land, Ohio. [The opinions expressed by the writer are his own and are not neces-
sarily those of his employer.]
la Lake Carriers Assoc. v. N. Y. Central R.R. et al., I.C.C. Docket 34822.
1 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
2 Wabash, St. L. and P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
3 Jaffe and Nathanson, Administrative Law 384 (2d. ed. 1961); Moore, What Limita-
tions, If Any, Should There Be On The Power of Common Carriers to Publish Rates
to Meet Intermodal Competition, Intramodal Competition, or Any Other Competi-
tion?, 30 ICC Prac. J. 10 (Oct., 1962).
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merous statutes4 were subsequently enacted to broaden jurisdiction over
the increasing transportation complexities and intense carrier competi-
tion stimulated by the expanding economy. The proprietary of the legis-
lative delegation of these powers was repeatedly challenged, but justifi-
cation was ultimately established through decisions of the courts.
Likewise, the wide range of administrative discretion and jurisdic-
tion in deciding intermodal matters came as a result of judicial analysis.
As early as 19075 the Supreme Court placed issues of rate reasonableness
within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Commission, thereby
initiating the doctrine that exhaustion of administrative remedies is man-
datory before judicial review is available.( The logic of this judicial legis-
lation7 was supported by the theory of administrative expertise.
4 To mention a few: The Elkins Act, 32 Stat. 847 (1903), was instigated by carriers
who were forced to give rate concessions in return for the traffic of powerful ship-
pers. Under this Act, shippers are subjected to liability for receiving rebates. In
response to the Supreme Court decision in 1897, ICC v. Cincinnati Ry., 167 U.S.
479 (1897), that the Commission's power to reject existing rates did not extend
a right to set them for the future; the Hepburn Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 584 (1906),
and the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 488 (1920), were enacted and authorized
the Commission to order maximum and minimum future rates, respectively. After
the Supreme Court decided in 1945, Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439(1945), that inter-carrier ratemaking came within the monopolistic regulation of the
Justice Department, The Reed-Bulwinkle Act was passed in 1948, 62 Stat. 472 (1948),
and provided carriers anti-trust immunity for discussion of rates under Commissionjurisdiction, Sec. 5a, Interstate Commerce Act.
The Transportation Acts of 1920, 1940 and 1958, 41 Stat. 488, 499 (1920), 54 Stat.
899 (1940), 72 Stat. 570 (1958), delegated to Commission jurisdiction the power to cure
competitive abuse, administer transportation policy, strengthen railroad financial ills,
develop water transportation and enforce rate-making guidelines in intermodal com-
petition.
The commodities clause, Sec. 1(8), Interstate Commerce Act, and the Panama
Canal Act, Sec. 5(14) (16), Interstate Commerce Act, empowered the Commission to
regulate common ownership in transportation. The former clause sought to end rail-
road ownership of commodities it carried so that like goods of others would be ac-
corded equal treatment. The latter Act prohibited railroads from owning a water
carrier with whom it could compete, unless justified in the public interest. The need
for this legislation came as a result of railroad operation of its water entity at de-
pressed rates that made entry or continued existence of independent water carriers
economically unfeasible. The shipping public was deprived of the benefits and serv-
ice of genuine competition. Lake Lines Applications Under the Panama Canal Act,
33 I.C.C. 699, 700, 716 (1915); Nupp, Regulatory Standards In Common Ownership In
Transportation, ICC Prac. J. 34:21 Nov.-Dec. '66.
5 Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
6 Ibid.; United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
7 Critics of the exclusive primary jurisdiction doctrine charge that it is a judicial
abandonment of duty, subverting congressional intent. The argument proceeds along
the lines that a shipper had a right to damages, under common law, for unreasonable
rates charged by a carrier. After the 1887 Act, he could still elect to bring his action
before the Commission or a court.
The contention is not without merit since the common law right was never spe-
cifically repealed. Sec. 22, Interstate Commerce Act is in point:
... and nothing in this part contained shall in any way abridge or alter the
remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this
part are in addition to such remedies ..
Texas and Pacific, supra n. 5. See generally, Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction:
The Rule and Its Rationalizations, 65 Yale L. J. 315 (1956).
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The rationale of Judge Brandeis is illustrative:
Preliminary resort to the Commission is required ... because the
inquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical mat-
ters; and uniformity can be secured only if its determination is left
to the Commission. Moreover, that determination is reached ordi-
narily upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate
appreciation of which acquaintance with many intricate facts of
transportation is indispensable; and such acquaintance is commonly
to be found only in a body of experts.
8
Uniformity of rates could not be achieved if several courts exercised
contemporaneous jurisdiction over a single movement through different
states.9 The result would be inconsistency in scope of remedy and en-
forcement. Therefore, initial determination by one nonpartisan body,
well-informed on the transportation system as a whole, affords a court
the benefit of previous expert findings when time for recourse to judicial
proceedings is ripe.'0
From a practical standpoint, discretionary latitude and primary
jurisdiction have lodged within the Commission a unique ability to
function with a minimum of interference. Conversely, these doctrines
have sometimes been the source of unwarranted hardship to carriers
who present their matters for impartial resolution.
Rail-Water Competition
Early activity of the Commission centered on preserving an open
market and insuring transportation development commensurate with
economic growth. Intermodal competition was not predominant and dis-
putes normally involved the railroads and shipping public."
The revitalization of the water carrier industry in the 1930's inten-
sified carrier competition and shippers were then able to instigate cut-
throat competition for their traffic in order to receive lower rates.'
2
Authority for many rail rate reductions aimed at capturing water
traffic is sanctioned by relief from the long and short haul provisions
under the Interstate Commerce Act.13 To satisfy the requirements, gen-
8 Great Northern Railway Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922).
9 Ibid.; Texas and Pacific, supra n. 5; Moore, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 11.
10 United States v. Western Pacific, supra n. 6; Eagle Cotton Oil Co. v. Southern Ry.
Co., 51 F. 2d 443 (5th Cir. 1931).
11 Moore, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 11.
12 Id. at 13-17.
'3 49 U.S.C. 4; Sec. 4(1), Interstate Commerce Act, "It shall be unlawful for any
common carrier . . . to charge . . .any greater compensation . . . for a shorter than
for a longer distance . . . in the same direction, the shorter being included within the
longer distance, or to charge any greater compensation as a through rate than the
aggregate of the intermediate rates . . .Provided, that .. . such carrier . . . may be
authorized by the Commission to charge less for longer than for shorter distances ...
(Continued on next page)
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uine competition must exist and reductions can be no lower than neces-
sary to meet the existing rate. In practice, reduced rail rates have often
been granted with little regard for statutory prerequisites.14
Liberal railroad access to the rate relief provisions has also placed
certain shippers at a competitive disadvantage. A landlocked shipper
loses his ability to compete in the same market with a shipper located
in the vicinity of rail-water competition. 15 Rail rates are seldom equated
in non-competitive areas because a high level of revenue from this traffic
maintains the "war chest" to finance losses caused by selective rate cut-
ting.16
Water carriers are not so fortunate. The large percentage of their
traffic is capable of being carried exclusively by rail.
Public interest in low-cost water transportation, encouraged by
statutory provisions for rail-water combination service under equitable
rate divisions and reasonable differentials,'1 7 has often been subverted
(Continued from preceding page)
and the Commission may prescribe the extent to which ... carrier ... may be re-
lieved .... but . . . the Commission shall not permit ... any charge .. .not reason-
ably compensatory . . .and no such authorizations shall be granted on account of
merely potential water competition not actually in existence ... "
14 For one instance of rail reductions under the relief provisions, the proponents used
the shipper's own private vessel as constituting the existence of "genuine" water
competition. The shipper had never actually used his vessel to participate in the
traffic but hoped to take advantage of lower rail rates, and asserted that reductions
were necessary to obtain his traffic.
This is one method that enables a railroad to achieve its real objective, i.e.,
instituting service on traffic that was previously handled exclusively by independent
water carrier. See: Hearings before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommit-
tee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate,
86th Congress, 2nd Session 121, 122 (1960).
The circumstances are similar to the abuse sought to be corrected under the
Panama Canal Act, supra n. 4. The attitude of legislators at that time could be sur-
mised by the following statement:
The proper function of a railroad corporation is to operate trains on its tracks,
not to occupy the waters with ships in mock competition with itself, which in
reality operate to the extinction of all genuine competition.
H.R. Rep. No. 423, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session 12 (1912); Nupp, op. cit. supra n. 4
at 23.
15 Sec. 3(1), Interstate Commerce Act: prohibits undue preference or prejudice to
any shipper or locality. Yet, this is exactly the result when rate reductions create
preferential charges to a shipper or locality in the vicinity of intermodal competition.
At the same time, the land-bound shipper continues to pay a high rate and suffers
a market disadvantage. Shinn, Tightening The Law of Undue Prejudice, ICC Prac. J.
33:331-333 Ja. '66; There, the author points out the general rule that existence of
carrier competition at one point, and absence of such at another point, creates a dis-
similarity of transportation circumstances that nullifies the prohibition against undue
prejudice within the meaning of Sec. 3(1). The landlocked shipper has no recourse
under Sec. 3(1) for any market disadvantage created by competitive reductions if the
defendant carrier successfully proves that its reduction is warranted by the dissim-
ilar conditions.
16 Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC, 61 Yale L. J. 467 (1952).
17 Sec. 1(4), Sec. 3(4), Interstate Commerce Act. These provisions impose a duty
on the rail carriers to establish combination service with water carriers under non-
discriminatory rate divisions. Sec. 305(b), Sec. 307(d), Interstate Commerce Act,
impose a similar duty on water carriers.
May, 1970
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because of the relative ease of rail rate manipulation to deny water trans-
port participation in a given market.1 8
The discretionary latitude exercised by the Commission has not been
the sole source of hardship. The nature of administrative proceedings
under the primary jurisdiction doctrine adds to the problems.19
Initial lawfulness of a reduced rate filed with the Commission
is determined by a suspension order.20 Following the general rule,
21
judicial review of the ruling on the suspension petition is not available
since administrative remedies have not been exhausted. This is so be-
cause a complaint can be filed and hearing scheduled by the Commission
after its suspension order.
22
The unavailability of judicial review from a suspension order is sig-
nificant. A denial of suspension permits the rate to become effective im-
mediately.23 Even if suspended, a rate automatically becomes effective
after seven months,2 4 sometimes before the subsequent hearing to deter-
mine lawfulness is completed. In spite of an ultimately favorable deci-
sion, a customer may have been forced into permanent use of a com-
peting mode because of substantial investment in material handling facil-
ities to accommodate loading or unloading requirements by the time
lethargic administrative procedure 25 has run its course.
is Railroads have historically resisted opportunity to initiate combination service and
often view established moves as the prime object of competitive attack. There are
a number of variations, but two basic methods are employed:
(1) Traffic capable of being carried exclusively by rail, but presently moving
rail-water. Railroad will reduce longer distance all-rail rate to the same level
as its rate to shorter distance lake transfer point. Shorter distance rate not pro-
portionately reduced and water carrier can no longer participate unless he car-
ries tonnage for nothing.
(2) Traffic presently moving all-rail, but could take water transportation for at
least part of the route. Railroad will maintain an inflated rate to the transfer
point leaving the water carrier an uneconomical rate basis in any combination
of charges that might attract a shipper using the all-rail method. Also see,
Huntington, op. cit. supra n. 16.
19 See generally, Towle, Appeal of ICC Suspension Orders, 35 ICC Prac. J. 220 (Jan.-
Feb. 1968).
20 Sec. 15 (7), Interstate Commerce Act.
21 Sec. 10, Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. 1009; provides:
Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by
law committed to agency discretion . . . (c) every final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial re-
view....
Courts have usually interpreted this section to mean that judicial review of sus-
pension orders is not available since it is a matter "by law committed to agency dis-
cretion." Towle, op. cit. supra n. 19 at 222, 224. However, judicial review will obtain
if the suspension order manifests abuse of Commission discretion by arbitrary and
capricious action. Coastwise Line v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 305, 306 (N.D. Cal.
1957).
22 Sec. 13 (1), Interstate Commerce Act.
23 Towle, op. cit. supra n. 19 at 220.
24 Sec. 15(7), supra n. 20.
25 As of November 30, 1966, the ICC had a backlog of 7200 cases, each averaging over
eight months to process. Fourth Section applications average 11 months and Investi-
(Continued on next page)
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Inherent Advantage
The Interstate Commerce Act does not delineate, nor has the Com-
mission ever decided, what precise standard for intermodal ratemaking
is proper for resolution of competitive disputes. The early stages of car-
rier competition prompted enactments directing the Commission to insure
that rail rates make a sufficient revenue return,26 that water transporta-
tion be encouraged, 27 that transportation charges must be just and rea-
sonable to be lawful, 28 and that public interest continue to be served by
economical and dependable transportation service. 29
The Transportation Act of 194080 contained what is known as the
National Transportation Policy and, thereby, introduced the concept of
"fair and impartial regulation of all modes . . . preserving the inherent
advantages of each." 31 The Commission was specifically directed to ad-
minister the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act "with a view to
carrying out" this policy. 2
The Transportation Act of 195833 added Section 15a (3) ,34 the rule
of intermodal rate-making, which was strongly sponsored by the railroad
industry. Section 15a (3)35 seems to present irreconcilable propositions
by first stating that ". . . Rates of a carrier shall not be held up . . . to
protect the traffic of any other mode," and then asserting that consider-
ation be given to "the objectives of the national transportation policy
(Continued from preceding page)
gation and Suspension dockets on lawfulness of proposed rates, 11.1 months. Haskell,
Why the Regulatory Lag?, 34 ICC Prac. J. 714, 719 (July-Aug. 1967).
26 Sec. 15a (2), Interstate Commerce Act; was incorporated from the Transportation
Act of 1920 and sought to end railroad financial deficits caused by cut-throat com-
petition. Jaffe and Nathanson, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 385.
27 Sec. 500, Transportation Act of 1920: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of
Congress to promote, encourage, and develop water transportation, .. ."
28 Sec. 1(5), Interstate Commerce Act. The Act contains five sections that deal with
transportation charges as distinguished from rules of rate-making. Rates and charges
must be just and reasonable, Sec. 1(5), non-discriminatory, Sec. 2, non-preferential,
Sec. 3(1), not greater for shorter than for longer distances, Sec. 4(1); and be pub-
lished and strictly observed, Sec. 6(1). Larwood, Which Single Improvement Of The
Interstate Commerce Act is Most Needed?, 33 ICC Prac. J. 339, 347 (Jan. 1966).
29 54 Stat. 899 (1940), National Transportation Policy under the Transportation Act
of 1940.
30 Ibid.
3' Ibid.
32 Ibid.; Known as the Whittington Amendment, this provision exemplified Congres-
sional fear that the Commission would continue to be "railroad-minded" after water
carriers were placed under its jurisdiction by the 1940 Act. Huntington, op. cit.
supra n. 16.
33 72 Stat. 570 (1958).
34 72 Stat. 572 (1958), Sec. 15a(3), Interstate Commerce Act.
35 For a railroad oriented, in-depth history of the legislative, administrative andjudicial treatment of Section 15a(3), see Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958
(1969).
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S. . ," i.e., preservation of carrier inherent advantage through impartial
regulation. The crux of the controversy in contemporary intermodal
cases centers on the posture of transportation policy within the rule of
rate-making; to be specific, what is inherent advantage, which carrier
has this advantage on the movement at issue and what cost criteria
should be used in this determination?
In most cases, a carrier has the inherent advantage if it proves that
it incurs the lowest cost on a particular movement. 3 6 Cost of service
has become the fundamental consideration and has engendered a prolific
response of economic theory. The Commission has been inconsistent in
deciding inherent advantage and what cost basis it might approve usu-
ally depends on the competitive circumstances presented for determi-
nation. T
In 1963, interpretation of Section 15a(3) was placed before the
Supreme Court for the first time in Interstate Commerce Commission v.
The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Co., et al.,s8 herein-
after referred to as the New Haven Case). There, 39 the ICC disallowed
rail rates that were above out-of-pocket cost 40 and, for some of the
movements involved, also above fully-distributed cost.41 The Commission
made no determination of inherent cost advantage on the traffic at issue,
but concluded that the rail rates would destroy the shipping industry
involved and therefore were unlawful within the meaning of destructive
competition. The Court, in reversing the ICC, said that unless a Na-
tional Defense need is at stake, proposed rates may not be cancelled with-
out first determining which carrier has the cost advantage. In other
36 McGehee, The Inherent Advantages of Carrier Modes Under The National Trans-
portation Policy, 34 ICC Prac. J. 722, 724, 725, 732 (July-Aug. 1967). The author
examines the legislative history to determine Congressional intent under National
Transportation Policy and Sec. 15a(3). He concludes that the sponsors of the inher-
ent advantage provision felt more protection was needed for the low-cost water car-
rier and that full cost was the proper basis to determine advantage.
37 Rose, Regulation of Rates and Intermodal Transport Competition, 33 ICC Prac. J.
11, 14, 15 (Oct. 1965); Williams, The ICC and The Regulation of Intercarrier Com-
petition, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1353 (1950).
"The broad discretion exercised by the Commission can be traced to the lack ofprecision in the Act which it is to enforce. While the Act will not tolerate an arbi-
trary administration, the lack of meaningful standards for effective regulatory con-
trol leaves the Commission free to exercise its discretion on a case-by-case basis
without establishing cost guidelines," see Hosmer, Twenty-five Years of the National
Transportation Policy (NTP), 33 ICC Prac. J. 411 (Feb. 1966); Farris, Definitional
Inconsistencies In The National Transportation Policy, 35 ICC Prac. J. 25 (Nov.-Dec. 1967); "Unfortunately, the meaning of the term "inherent advantage," which is
what the Commission is supposed to protect, is nowhere spelled out in the statute."
American Commercial Lines, Inc., et al., v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. et al., 392
U.S. 571, 581 (1968).
8s 372 U.S. 744 (1963).
39 Id. at 749, 750, 758, 764.
40 Out-of-pocket costs are generally those directly incurred by the movement at
issue and do not include any allocation for pre-existing overhead expenses.
41 Fully distributed costs generally include out-of-pocket costs plus an allocation of
some portion, or all, of the pre-existing overhead expenses, i.e., constant costs.
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words, within the meaning of Section 15a (3), rates of one carrier should
not be held to a high level in order to protect the established business
of another carrier unless the latter is entitled to retain the traffic by
proving its inherent advantage, i.e., lower cost, on the movement at issue.
While the Court offered constructive guidelines to determine "de-
structive competitive practices," 42 it significantly avoided any definition
of the proper cost basis for inherent advantage by referring the matter
back to the Commission:
It is not for us to make this determination at this stage, or to decide
in advance precisely how either carrier's inherent advantages should
be measured or protected. It may be, for example, that neither a
comparison of "out-of-pocket" nor a comparison of "fully-
distributed" costs as those terms are defined by the Commission, is
the appropriate method of deciding which of two competing modes
has the cost advantages on a given movement.
43
The New Haven decision resulted in greater rate-making freedom
for the railroads. 44 Water carriers, unable to protect their traffic, remain
especially vulnerable when the ICC sanctions out-of-pocket 45 rail rates.
The Commission, geared to the type of competition involved, sometimes
favors rail rates that merely cover out-of-pocket costs and almost always
allows those that cover fully-distributed costs, regardless of the conse-
quences on the other mode.44 If a railroad is competing for regulated
water traffic, the Commission will normally favor the carrier with a cost
advantage. 47 However, where railroad reductions are made to attract
unregulated water traffic, which, significantly, comprises close to 90 per-
cent of its tonnage, 48 the Commission has usually felt it unnecessary to
determine which mode has the inherent advantage. 49 In these instances,
42 An analysis of the case leads to the possible following conclusions: 1. Reduced
rates may be lawful even though they threaten the existence of another mode.
2. A carrier with a cost advantage may reduce rates to any level above out-of-
pocket, regardless of the consequences on the competing mode. 3. Rates covering
fully-distributed costs are lawful no matter which mode has the inherent advantage,
with only one exception which is- 4. The competing mode is vital to National De-
fense and its existence is threatened. 5. If the carrier reducing its rate does not have
a cost advantage and the rate fails to return fully-distributed costs, it still may be
lawful if the competing mode with a cost advantage does not have to reduce its own
rate to an unremunerative level to retain the business. 6. A competitive rate, lower
than necessary to meet competition, does not always constitute an unfair competitive
practice, even though it creates a preference contra to Sec. 3(1). See Shinn, op. cit.
supra n. 15 at 332; McGehee, op. cit. supra n. 36 at 727, 728; Rose, op. cit. supra n. 37
at 12-19; Levine, The Railroad Industry's Experience Under Section 15a (3) of the
Transportation Act of 1958; 35 ICC Prac. J. 252, 256, 258 (Jan.-Feb. 1968).
43 I.C.C. v. N.Y., N.H. and Hartford R.R. Co., supra n. 38, at 760. See also: McGehee,
op. cit. supra n. 36 at 728.
44 Levine, op. cit. supra n. 42 at 259.
45 Supra n. 40.
46 Supra n. 42.
47 Rose, op. cit. supra n. 37 at 17.
48 McGehee, op. cit. supra n. 36 at 722.
49 Rose, op. cit. supra n. 37 at 22.
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rail rates have been approved that slightly exceed out-of-pocket costs
and, on occasion, were even below out-of-pocket costs.50
The last expression of the Supreme Court came in 1968 in American
Commercial Lines, Inc. et al., v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. et al.,5'
(hereinafter referred to as the Ingot Molds case). The Ingot Molds52 case
involved regulated traffic where the railroads lowered their joint rate
from $11.86 to meet the combination barge-truck rate of $5.11. It was
shown that the railroads had the lower out-of-pocket cost but the barge-
truck service had the lower fully-distributed cost for the movement.
In reversing the District Court and reinstating the Commission de-
cision, which rejected the reduced rail rate, the Supreme Court referred
to the New Haven5 3 case and again emphasized that it was within Com-
mission expertise to decide which cost basis should be used to determine
inherent advantage. 54 The Supreme Court rejected the contention of the
District Court and railroads that the New Haven55 case and Section
15a (3) 1 commanded that the Commission use out-of-pocket cost to de-
termine inherent advantage in every competitive situation.57 The Su-
preme Court was satisfied with the Commission's action in prohibiting
the reduced rail rates, since the barge-truck service had the cost advan-
tage on a fully-distributed basis and would have had to lower its rates
to retain the business, thereby undercutting the ability to exploit its
inherent advantage. 58
Citing Commission decisions permitting out-of-pocket rail rates to
attract unregulated traffic, the District Court challenged the Commission
contention that it normally looked to fully-distributed cost to determine
advantage. 59 The Supreme Court considered this question and its ra-
tionale is especially ominous to independent Great Lakes carriers whose
principal traffic is unregulated and subject to constant rail attack:
50 Ibid.
51 392 U.S. 571 (1968).
52 Ibid.
53 I.C.C. v. N.Y., etc., supra n. 38.
54 The resolution of the appropriate basis for inherent advantage was again left for
the informed judgment of the Commission. American Commercial Lines, Inc., et al.,
supra note 51 at 591.
55 I.C.C. v. N.Y., etc., supra n. 38.
56 Supra n. 34.
57 The Supreme Court concluded that it could not disregard legislative prohibition
of uncompensatory pricing inasmuch as the history of Section 15a(3) reflected a
congressional intent that railroads should not be permitted to price on an out-of-
pocket basis to meet all competition. Any other interpretation would allow railroad
allocation of overhead expenses to landlocked traffic in order to finance below cost
rates and outlast competitors. American Commercial Lines, Inc., et al., supra n. 51
at 578, 586, 589, 590.
58 Id. at 593.
59 Id. at 584.
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The District Court also objected to the failure of the Commission to
explain why it permitted out-of-pocket rate-making where the com-
peting carrier was unregulated and not where the competition was
regulated. The short answer to this is that Section 15a (3) by its
own terms applies only to "modes of transportation subject to this
act," which by definition means regulated carriers. As a result, any
arbitrariness that may flow from the distinction recognized by the
Commission between regulated and unregulated carriers in situa-
tions of intermodal competition is the creation of Congress, not of
the Commission.60
The Court also noted that the Commission is engaged in a pending
rulemaking proceeding 61 involving an in-depth examination to decide
proper cost standards applicable to intermodal competition, which will
hopefully resolve the inherent advantage issue.
The Bulk Exemption and the Great Lakes Water Carrier
When water carriers were placed under ICC jurisdiction in 1940,6 2
waterborne transportation of bulk commodities0 3 was exempted from
regulation.64 The bulk exemptions 5 were justified to meet the threat of
Canadian carriers and the belief that bulk traffic was not the subject of
intermodal competition.
The bulk exemptions have generated problems unforeseen by its
sponsors. The American water carrier has never been competitive with
its Canadian counterpart who enjoys modest operating and construction
costs through lower wage scales and government-sponsored ship sub-
sidies. Furthermore, bulk water traffic is currently the object of intense
rail competition in spite of sizable railroad investment in shoreside facil-
ities to coordinate rail-lake movements.
The bulk exemptions have also enabled private carriers to engage
in for-hire 6 transportation, offering unneeded capacity or backhaul space
60 Id. at 593.
61 Rules Governing the Assembling and Presenting of Cost Evidence, ICC Docket
No. 34013.
62 54 Stat. 929 (1940); Part III, Interstate Commerce Act.
63 "The term 'commodities in bulk' is a common one and is used in describing fun-
gibles, which can be poured, scooped, or shoveled, and which generally are of such
size that they cannot be handled piece by piece. Typical of such bulk commodities
are coal, ore, sand, gravel, and grains." John J. Mulqueen Contract Carrier Appli-
cation, 250 I.C.C. 436, 439 (1942).
64 49 U.S.C. 903; Sec. 303(b), 303(c), Interstate Commerce Act.
65 Ibid.
60 "For-hire" normally refers to water transportation by a common carrier who holds
itself out to service the general public for compensation, Sec. 302(d), Interstate Com-
merce Act. A certificate of public convenience and necessity, issued by the Commis-
sion, is a prerequisite, Sec. 309(a), Interstate Commerce Act. The status of the com-
mon carrier by water is most often confused when it transports exempt commodities.
In such instances, it does not become an unregulated carrier because the bulk exemp-
(Continued on next page)
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at depressed rates covering bare costs. Rate stability is absent because
bulk exempt traffic is not controlled by tariffs publicly6 7 filed with the
Commission.
Coming under Commission jurisdiction some 50 years after its
land based competitor, water carriers stood a distinct disadvantage to
the partisan relationships previously cultivated. While there is some
merit in the contention that the Commission has been "railroad-
minded," 68 the water carrier could do little to enhance its position when
the majority of its traffic6 9 was excluded from Commission supervision.
The consequences have been serious when railroads are competing
for unregulated water traffic. The rationale70 of the Ingot Molds case
serves to fortify Commission policy of refusing to consider inherent
advantage and tolerating open discrimination when out-of-pocket rates
are aimed at exempt water tonnage over which it has no control. 71 The
(Continued from preceding page)
tions specifically refer to the transportation and not the carrier. Therefore, in situa-
tions where transportation of bulk commodities is exempted under Part III, a common
carrier by water is still controlled by regulatory provisions elsewhere in the Act.
67 Sec. 306, Interstate Commerce Act.
68 Supra note 32; Huntington, op. cit. supra n. 16; McGehee, op. cit. supra n. 36 at
724.
69 McGehee, op. cit. supra n. 36 at 722.
70 Supra n. 60; There were some positive aspects of the case however, such as judi-
cial awareness of the continued need for a strong water carrier industry to deter
railroad abuse, as was evidenced by the Supreme Court rationale on economic argu-
ments offered by railroad witnesses. Economic support for railroad predatory prac-
tices was justified as follows: Railroads should be permitted to selectively price their
services on a slightly above out-of-pocket basis because a shipper benefits fromlower rates and the new traffic makes some contribution to railroad overhead, i.e.,
constant costs. Other shippers also benefit because the new traffic will begin to pay
a portion of the constant costs previously being charged entirely to them. The over-
all shipper benefit outweighs the harm caused to the other mode and the discrimi-
natory preference afforded the competitively located shipper who pays a dispropor-
tionately low amount of railroad overhead.
The Supreme Court was not impressed with the railroad logic. It pointed out
that the existence of a competing mode is the sole reason for initiating below cost
rate reductions. If the competing mode is driven out of business because of its eco-
nomic inability to match out-of-pocket rates, then there is no justification for main-
taining low rates. A railroad could then raise these rates and initiate out-of-pocket
rates in a different competitive area. Eventually, a railroad would be able to elimi-
nate all its competition and then justify repricing all services on a fully distributedbasis in order to remove customer discrimination. At this point, certain shippers have
permanently lost low cost benefits that existed under competitive circumstances.
The Court inquired if public interest in low cost service would be better served
by insuring the continued existence of railroad competitors, while railroads attempt
to increase traffic and revenue through more economical charges for landlocked cus-
tomers who, but for excessive rates, would be able to maximize their volume of ship-
ments to the marketplace. American Commercial Lines, Inc., et al., supra n. 51 at
U.S. 586-589.
71 Rose, op. cit. supra n. 37 at 22; "The Commission will not concern itself with un-
regulated water traffic subjected to rail competition because there is no way to ascer-
tain adequate knowledge of rate pricing and cost comparisons of traffic not under
regulatory control." Morgan, A Critique of "The Marasmus," 62 Yale L. J. 171 (1953);
The Supreme Court noted the Commission preference for fully distributed cost com-
(Continued on next page)
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Commission may justify its attitude on the premise that railroads should
not be restrained from competing for exempt tonnage which the water
carrier transports with complete freedom to adjust rates. The fallacy
of this argument is the water carrier inability to use its rate freedom to
any advantage, since it has neither the competitively isolated traffic used
by railroads to finance below cost rate wars nor the financial resources
to sustain unremunerative levels.
Even more acute is the status of regulated lake transportation.
Regulated water tonnage is usually moved in low volume shipments by
small vessels utilizing expensive specialized equipment. As a result, the
traffic bears a higher cost-per-ton ratio than large volume bulk moves,
and, in many instances, water costs approximate railroad costs. Since
the New Haven72 decision granted legality to rail rates if the railroad
can prove a cost advantage, the future of the higher cost segment of the
lakes water industry is not promising.
Conclusion
Substantially all waterborne tonnage is unregulated and a prime
competitive target. Because the Commission will not usually consider
required differentials or inherent cost advantages on traffic exempt from
its control, 73 the water carrier has become a dependent customer of the
railroads who are able to control the amount of their water competition.
7 4
This is especially true when water traffic takes a prior or subsequent rail
haul.
An important current case in point is Lake Carriers' Association et
al. v. New York Central R.R. et al.75 This controversy involves the
movement of coal from mine origins to generating plant destinations.
Before unit train rate reductions, coal moved by rail from mines to a
lake transfer point and then to ultimate destination by vessel. Because
destination as well as origin points can be served by land, the railroads
lowered rates on the longer distance, all-rail routes to the approximate
levels charged for the shorter distance route to lake transfer points. The
result was termination of water participation in the movement unless the
water carrier performed its service at a loss. The water carriers have
(Continued from preceding page)
parisons in situations involving intermodal competition for regulated traffic and out-
of-pocket cost comparisons for ascertaining inherent advantage where one of the
competing modes is unregulated. American Commercial Lines, Inc., et al., supra n.
51 at U.S. 584, 593.
72 ICC v. N.Y., etc., supra n. 38; supra n. 42.
73 Supra n. 71.
74 Testimony of Jesse J. Friedman before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
Docket No. 34822. (January 31, 1969).
75 ICC Docket 34822.
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petitioned that the railroads make comparable reductions over the lake
transfer route in order to preserve the combination service.
Lake shipping interests expect to lose about 30 percent of their coal
business if the rail reductions are maintained.7 6 Significantly, the water
tonnage is bulk exempt and presents circumstances where the ICC has
offered little protection to the water carrier.
77
The competitive and regulatory surroundings are similar to those
presented in the celebrated Corn Products78 case inasmuch as the water
carrier is a competitor as well as a customer of the railroad, dependent
on fair economic treatment for survival.79 The predicament was cogently
depicted by one shipping executive in a recent speech:
Lake transportation of coal is being forced out of existence simply
because railroads have the economic power to stand on the oxygen
hose the lake industry requires for survival.
8 0
An impartial climate under Commission jurisdiction is mandatory
for the survival of the independent water carrier. Effective ICC regu-
lation of competition through minimum rate control and preservation of
inherent low cost water transportation must be achieved by legislative
amendment which will modify or repeal the exemption s ' provisions.
Remedial measures are long overdue, as is evidenced by the dete-
rioration of the Great Lakes fleet. About 10 vessels per year have been
retired since 1960.s2 The same industry that kept 90% of the nation's
steel plants supplied with iron ore during World War II has withdrawn
over 130 ships from service since 1953 and at least 60% of its present fleet
is over 40 years old.
8 3
76 Ibid.
77 Supra n. 71.
78 U.S. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D. N.Y. 1916).
79 Testimony of Jesse J. Friedman, supra n. 74.
80 Remarks of John J. Dwyer, Executive Vice-President, Oglebay-Norton Co., before
The Toledo Chamber of Commerce (June 25, 1969).
81 Supra n. 64.
82 Marine News, The Cleveland Plain Dealer (August 5, 1969), p. 2-C.
83 Miller, Punitive Damages Against Shipowners, 18 Clev. St. L. Rev. 564, 573 (1969).
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